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A capitalist economy turns almost everything into a commodity.  Certainly, it forces people to 
try and sell their labour in a ‘labour market’ in order to earn a living.  Hence the labour market is of 
central importance to the life chances of the vast bulk of the population.  Only the very young, the old 
and  incapacitated  are  spared  the  usually  grueling  challenge  of  ‘competing’  in  the  labour  market.  
Obviously, the most humane way of running such a system is to give those who need or want to work a 
good job on reasonable wages.  The labour market quickly becomes inhumane for those who cannot 
find a good job or any or enough work.  
This chapter argues that Australia’s labour market – indeed most capitalist labour markets – 
feature  too  much  unemployment  and  underemployment  and  associated  forms  of  labour  market 
insecurity or disadvantage.  The later term implies a weak or tenuous connection to the labour force 
through  underemployment  or  involuntary  casual  or  part-time  work  and/or  low  wages  or  other 
manifestations of weakness vis-à-vis employers.  The direct and indirect costs of such malfunctions in 
the labour market are reflected in all sorts of economic, social and health costs (Watts 2000; Saunders 
and Taylor 2002).  A good deal of social policy is directed to problems emanating from the labour 
market  and  its  various  malfunctions  –  especially  unemployment,  underemployment  and  inequality.  
Accordingly,  a  good  way  to  minimize  the  need  for  expensive  and  often  difficult  social  policy 
interventions is to organize the labour market so that it provides reasonable jobs and wages for those 
that seek them. 
Unfortunately, creating such a labour market is not easy.  There are inevitable tensions and 
conflicts  between  employers  and  employees  over  shares  of  wages  and  profits.    Also,  capitalist   2 
economies have rarely created full employment.  The so-called ‘Golden Age’ of capitalism in the post 
World War II era was a rare period of managed capitalism, full employment and rising living standards 
for most.  But employers are wary of full employment because it strengthens the bargaining hand of 
labour, leads to upward pressure on wages and can generate high levels of (wage push) inflation.  It 
was this scenario that saw the collapse of the Golden Age in the 1970s in Australia and many other 
capitalist economies.  The aftermath, in the 1970s and 1980s, was marked by relatively high levels of 
unemployment  and  inflation.    It  is  only  since  the  deep  recession  of  the  early  1990s  that  western 
economies have been broadly stabilized on a path of low inflation, economic expansion (especially in 
Australia) and falling unemployment.  
According to the official estimates, after over a decade of reasonably strong economic growth, 
Australian now has an unemployment rate of 5.2 per cent.  That sounds reasonably low.  However, this 
chapter argues that a more accurate measure of unemployment would see this number almost double.  
Also,  structural  change  in  the  economy  is  producing  a  labour  market  that  tends  to  create  causal, 
insecure and low paid jobs.  It is this combination of unemployment and labour market insecurity 
which has played an important role in moderating (wage push) inflation in recent decades.  
This chapter begins by looking at the dynamics of the Australian labour market. We also look 
at how the economy is producing increasing levels of labour market insecurity and also how this and 
unemployment are increasing economic inequality in Australia. 
Based on the assumption that more work and better pay would reduce the need for expensive 
social policy interventions, we examine the various positions in the employment policy debate.  We 
then examine employment policy in Australia and briefly examine the costs and dilemmas of returning 
to a full employment economy.  We argue that Australia has a half baked ‘full employability’ policy 
aimed at getting people ready for employment, but not a ‘full employment’ policy that – at least in a 
direct sense - actually helps create jobs.   
 
Australia’s Labour Market Dynamics 
 
Typical  of  wider  trends  in  the  advanced  economies,  the  Australian  labour  market  has 
undergone dramatic  changes in recent decades.   The  structure of employment has changed with  a 
higher premium placed on skills and knowledge.  At the lower end of the market, traditional unskilled 
‘blue collar’ jobs have been rapidly disappearing, though simultaneously there has been a proliferation 
of  part-time  and/or  casual  jobs  in  the  low  end  services  sector.    For  these  and  other  reasons, 
unemployment, under-employment, insecure forms of work, low wages and rising levels of inequality 
have all become major problems in Australia’s labour market.   
The increase and subsequent decline in the official unemployment rate in recent decades is 
shown graphically in figure 1.  A major driver of unemployment has been the size of the gap between 
labour force growth and employment levels, especially the large gaps opened up in each of the major 
recessions during the 1970s and in the early 1980s and early 1990s.  The main story of the last three   3 
decades is that major recessions - as periods of intense job destruction - have a devastating impact on 
employment growth and are a major factor in driving up unemployment and embedding high levels of 
structural and long term unemployment. 
 
Figure 1 
Unemployment in Australia, 1960-2004 



































Although, the official measure of unemployment currently stands at just over 5 per cent of the 
labour force, it is important to remember that the method of measuring unemployment used by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) is highly selective and grossly understates the true level of the 
problem.  One hour of paid employment in the relevant survey reference week (or an hour of unpaid 
employment in a family business) can remove one from the unemployment statistics.  There are also 
large numbers of people who (for various reasons) are classified  as ‘not in  the labour force’. The 
implication,  as  Lee  and  Miller  (2000:  76)  suggest,  is  that  ‘the  official  unemployment  rate  is  not 
reflective of the true state of the labour market’.   
Langmore and Quiggin (1994) consider a range of forms of unemployment not included in the 
official  measure.  First,  there  are  persons  who  have  given  up  trying  to  find  work  and  who  were 
officially counted as ‘discouraged job seekers’. These are part of a larger group who would like work if 
it were available, but are not looking for a job at present. Mitchell and Watts (1997) estimate that if the   4 
hidden unemployment and underemployment of those with a designated marginal attachment to the 
labour force were properly taken into account, about 5 percentage points could be added to the official 
rate  of  unemployment.    Similarly,  Wooden  (1996)  estimates  that  the  official  category  of 
‘unemployment’ captures only about half of the true level of labour under-utilisation (see also Mitchell 
2001, and Mitchell and Carlson 2001). 
Second, there are underemployed workers – those working part-time who would like to work 
full time (note: During the 1990s, a new and opposite category emerged – those working more than a 
standard fulltime workweek who would like to work less). 
Third, there are people of working age who have left the labour force and gone on to disability 
benefits,  or  taken  early  access  to  the  old  age  pension.  Some  recipients  of  disability  benefits  are 
completely  incapacitated  for  work.  However,  many  people  with  minor  disabilities  who  would  be 
employable in a properly functioning labour market have ended up on disability benefits. Given that 
the health status of the population has generally been improving, the large increase in the number of 
people receiving disability benefits can only be regarded as a form of disguised unemployment. 
Similarly,  it  is  often  difficult  to  distinguish  between  voluntary  and  involuntary  early 
retirement. Nevertheless, a reduction in workforce participation for workers aged over 50 does not 
make economic sense in a context where the proportion of the population in this age group can be 
expected to increase steadily. 
 Table 1 presents the numbers of persons in the various relevant categories as of September 
2003.  As can be seen there are large numbers of people who were not working, who wanted to work, 
but who were not counted as unemployed.  Note also, the large number of persons who have given up 
trying to find work and who were officially counted as ‘discouraged job seekers’.    5 
Table 1 
Persons in and not in the Labour Force 
 




Besides underestimating the true level of unemployment, it is also the case, as per a recent survey by 
Bell (2002) and other sources, that: 
•  There has been a steep rise in the level of long-term unemployment, with the duration of 
unemployment roughly doubling since the late 1970s.  This is one of the key and apparently 
enduring ‘scarring’ effects of major recessions and periods of high unemployment.  At present 
almost  a  third  of  the  unemployed  have  been  unemployed  for  more  than  a  year  and  are 
officially classified as long term unemployed.  
•  Although declining somewhat in the 1990s, the employment/GDP ratios across the advanced 
economies (including Australia) have been relatively strong since the 1970s.  Although there 
has been ‘jobless growth’ in a number of sectors (mining, agriculture and manufacturing), this 
has not been the case in aggregate terms.  Nevertheless, the growth of employment and the   6 
relatively strong jobs intensity of output growth since the 1970s has not kept pace with the 
demand for jobs.  Persistent unemployment reflects the failure of the labour market to create 
enough  jobs  to  satisfy  demand.    Indeed,  the  unemployed  persons/job  vacancy  ratio  has 
averaged around 11:1 since the early 1970s (Mitchell 2001: 17). Whilst unemployment was 
once relatively evenly distributed, there is now a strong trend towards jobs rich and jobs poor 
households, neighborhoods and regions (Gregory and Hunter 1996).  One in six children now 
grow up in jobless households.   
•  In the long 1990s expansion, many labour market ‘insiders’ did well in terms of growth in 
skilled employment and higher wages.  However, there were also many labour market fringe 
dwellers  in  low  paid  and  insecure  forms  of  work,  whilst  many  labour  market  ‘outsiders’ 
languish in unemployment or severe underemployment.   
•  The employment rate for women has increased substantially in recent decades, and the labour 
market status of women has improved relative to that of men. In the 1970s, males had about 
half the unemployment rate of females.  Now males have higher unemployment rates than 
females.  Indeed, male full-time employment in the age range 45-54 has fallen by 16 per cent 
since 1970 and by 32 per cent over the same period in the 55-64 age range (Keating 2004: 
115).  Youth and the less skilled also suffer relatively high levels of unemployment.   
•  The  most  systematic  observation  across  the  various  trends  is  that  unemployment  is 
overwhelmingly a problem for low skilled male workers facing the effects of structural change 
in industries or regions that are shedding labour.  A particular hotspot in this regard has been 
labour shedding  in  the  manufacturing  sector (Gregory  and Hunter 1996).  Unemployment 
levels  for  such  male  workers  would  have  been  even  more  acute  had  there  not  been  a 
substantial decline in male full-time labour market participation rates.   
•  Much of the employment created in the current recovery (starting in the early 1990s) has 
consisted of part-time and/or casual jobs.  It is also the case that a significant proportion of 
new jobs are relatively insecure and poorly paid, while a smaller number of high-income, 
high-status  jobs  have  been  created.  This  partly  reflects  structural  change  in  the  economy.  
Full-time employment losses in the manufacturing and public sectors have in many cases been 
replaced by employment in the low-end market services sector.  Other contributors include 
rapid changes in the structure of demand, changing product cycles and heightened competitive 
pressures  with  a  greater  emphasis  on  bottom  line  returns  leading  employers  to  abandon 
assumptions  about  durable  employment  patterns  in  favour  of  downsizing  and  greater 
‘flexibility’.  The net effect is far higher levels of labour ‘churning’ and an associated rise in 
frictional unemployment,  in some  cases blending into  long term unemployment (Hancock 
1999).   
•  There has been a major expansion of ‘non-standard’ forms of work in Australia, particularly 
casual and part-time work, typically with reduced levels of job security.  Sheehan  (1998: 241) 
argues that since 1973, 1 in 5 full-time jobs have been lost in the economy.  Put another way, 
'if  the  1973  ratio  of  full-time  employment  to  the  population  of  working  age  had  been   7 
maintained through to 1996, the number of full-time jobs available in the Australian economy 
would have been about 2.8 million higher than was actually the case'.  Campbell (2000) shows 
that between 1990 and 1999, 71 per cent of the growth of employment was accounted for by 
the  growth  of  casual  employment.    Over  the  same  decade,  the  proportion  of  full-time, 
permanent employees in the labour force declined from 73.5 per cent to 63.4 per cent.  As 
Campbell (2000: 70) argues, ‘At the level of the workforce as a whole, casual employment 
appears to be slowly replacing full-time permanent employment’.  Male full-time employment 
increased by only 5 per cent in the thirteen years between 1989 and 2002 (Keating 2004: 115). 
•  Income  inequality  is  increasing  (Borland  1999).    Significant  areas  of  jobs  growth  in  the 
services sector (including accommodation and cafes, retail and wholesale trade and personal 
and other services) pay at or below average weekly wages.  This expansion of low wage 
services  employment  in Australia, combined with unemployment  and less  equal access  to 
work, has produced a marked shift towards a more inegalitarian distribution of incomes.  For 
example, the earnings of male full time workers in the lowest income decile fell from 76 per 
cent of median earnings in 1975 to 65 per cent in 2000, whilst the corresponding fall for 
females was from 80 to 71 per cent (Keating 2004: 114).   
 
The Policy Response Thus Far 
 
A number of major public policy issues are raised by the labour market dynamics outlined 
above.  One issue is what to do about unemployment and underemployment?  A second issue is how to 
address the problem of increasing inequality born of unemployment, underemployment and structural 
change in the labour market?  A third related issue pertains to the role of social policy and the welfare 
state? 
In terms of unemployment and under-employment, these stem from the failure of the economy 
to create sufficient jobs (or perhaps the right kinds of jobs) to meet the demands for work.  The policy 
debate on how best to create more jobs has traditionally been polarized between neoliberal ‘supply-
side’ arguments and Keynesian-inspired ‘demand-side’ arguments. 
For supply-siders unemployment is mainly a problem of labour supply.  In other words, those 
who  are  unemployed  are  (market)  deficient  in  some  way:  including  laziness,  education  or  skill 
deficiencies, an unwillingness to move to where jobs are on offer, asking for 'excessive' wages etc.  
The cure for such problems, according to supply-siders, is a dose of 'microeconomic reform' of the 
labour market designed to reduce structural rigidities and increase labour skills and 'flexibility'.  This 
might  include  efforts  to  force  people  off  the  dole  to  search  harder  for  work,  education  and  skills 
enhancement, labour market programs (eg. re-location subsidies, job placement services etc) and/or 
efforts to reduce wages.   
Education and skills enhancement is a good idea,  especially since (as  above) most of  the 
unemployed are in low skilled areas of the labour market.  However, there is no guarantee that more   8 
education and training will create jobs.  Such an approach could end up with better trained cues of 
unemployed.  The critical issue is how to create more jobs, especially in the short to medium term.  The 
view that reducing wages will help price workers into jobs and thus help ‘clear’ the market is based on 
a rather simple demand and supply view of the world: if something is cheaper (in this case labour) 
more will be demanded.   Because unemployment is currently most pronounced  amongst low  skill 
workers, the advocates of a supply-side program argue for wages cuts for low skilled jobs.  This view 
has been endorsed by the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Ian Macfarlane.  In a speech in 1997, he cited 
the situation in the larger continental European economies, where labour markets have an institutional 
framework which promotes 'jobs security, imposes relatively strict minimum wages and conditions, 
provides  easily  accessible  sickness  benefits  and  unemployment  benefits,  and  increases  trade  union 
involvement'.  These, Macfarlane argues, 'work against the interests of job creation' (Macfarlane 1997: 
6). The solution Macfarlane advocates is further movement towards US, UK and New Zealand style 
labour market deregulation.  This, Macfarlane concedes, will reduce wages and conditions for workers 
and lead to growing wage dispersion and inequality, but it is a price we must pay, he argues.  On the 
question of fairness, he states that 'while income inequality may not seem very fair, unemployment is 
not very fair either' (Macfarlane 1997: 6).  Some economists call this the 'diabolical trade-off'.    
The problem with this approach is that it is not at all clear that wage cuts actually create much 
employment (Junankar 2000).  If anything, labour markets have become more flexible in the last two 
decades yet unemployment  and underemployment continue to be major problems (Standing 1997).  
Also, a wage moderation or wage cutting approach to unemployment is not likely  to prove  to be 
electorally  popular,  so  governments  have  not  been  keen  to  openly  advocate  such  a  policy  stance.  
Instead, governments have tended to adopt various kinds of labour market ‘flexibility’ approaches, 
including strengthening the hand of employers in wage bargaining under moves towards ‘enterprise 
bargaining’.  Such moves have not lead to a substantial widening of wage relativities (Keating 2004: 
67-68),  although  flexibility  has  increased  in  terms  of  working  hours  and  how  work  is  organized.  
Governments have also worked to make the dole less attractive and various schemes involving skills 
training and other labour market programs have also been adopted.  In Australia, however, these latter 
programs have tended to be rather poorly funded and ad hoc.  The constant churning of people through 
such programs, often with limited results in terms of employment, has lead to much frustration on the 
part of those forced through such programs.  The basic problem of course is that there are too few 
appropriate jobs on offer.  As a former senior public servant has recently written, unless there are more 
jobs  and  better  training  and  skills  enhancement:  ‘the  present  government’s  policy  of  requiring 
unemployed  persons  to  pursue  non-existent  jobs  will  continue  to  be  both  impractical  and  morally 
bankrupt’ (Keating 2004: 120). 
Demand-siders, by contrast, recognize structural unemployment  and supply-side problems, 
but place much more emphasis in explaining and dealing with unemployment on economic growth and 
the  demand-side  of  the  economy.    As  Mitchell  (2002)  argues,  the  main  factors  that  have  driven 
unemployment in the last two decades are weak aggregate demand and inadequate levels of growth, 
particularly during major recessions. Consequently, demand-side analysts argue that the avoidance of 
recessions  and  faster  economic  growth  are  central  to  dealing  with  unemployment  and   9 
underemployment.  They argue that government can play a role in stimulating economic growth, for 
example, through the careful use of fiscal policy (ie. taxing and spending powers) to help stimulate the 
economy (Nevile 2000).   
However, such aggregate economic growth may run into limits in terms of current account 
problems or via higher growth leading to higher inflation.  An alternative is a more precise and targeted 
approach to job creation, mainly through publicly funded public and community sector jobs creation 
(Langmore and Quiggin 1994, Bell 2000; Quiggin 2000). This approach has the advantage of not being 
likely  to  exacerbate  current  account  pressures  and  is  better  placed  to  more  directly  manage  wage 
pressures and inflation.  To the extent that unemployment is mainly a problem for the unskilled, such a 
program is also likely to be more easily blended with specific skills training.  And to the extent that 
skills upgrading is too onerous or difficult for some, direct jobs creation might also aim to supply low 
skilled jobs for those that require them.  The biggest problem with such direct jobs creation programs is 
that they cost money and will confront opposition from those who resist any increase in taxation and 
government spending. 
The practical difficulties of pursuing a strong dose of either a supply or demand side approach 
to unemployment and underemployment has meant that governments have adopted limited versions of 
each  approach  and  have  tended  to  muddle  along  on  a  middle  path.    Reasonably  strong  economic 
growth over the  last decade or more has helped reduce unemployment  and such a trend has been 
accompanied  by  the  kinds  of  supply-side  and  labour  market  ‘flexibility’  policies  noted  above.  
However, even after over a decade of economic growth, unemployment has been agonizingly slow in 
coming  down  and  a  range  of  other  adverse  labour  market  trends  noted  above  are  apparent.    A 
significant slow down or recession would again bring labour market issues and unemployment into 
stark relief.  Ultimately, a much more substantial policy response in terms of education and training (in 
order to better match skills to available jobs) and to promote targeted public sector job creation are 
required.  Yet over the last decade or more, reasonable rates of economic growth and the realization by 
governments  that unemployment  and other  adverse labour market  trends do not  seem  to be biting 
politically, has seen the unemployment issue more or less shelved for now. 
By contrast, Australian governments have taken the issue of rising market inequality more 
seriously.  Traditional tax and spend social policy and welfare state interventions have had a major 
effect in treating at least the symptoms of many of the labour market trends outlined above, especially 
in ameliorating inequality.  Indeed, thus far, the effects of the labour market dynamics outlined above 
in driving inequality have largely been offset by governments using taxation, cash payments and the 
provision of services.  In other words, although private market income inequality has increased, the 
total disposable and final incomes available to households have not shown a marked trend towards 
greater inequality, largely because of various measures taken by government.  For example, twenty five 
years ago low income households in Australia received little in the way of direct income transfers.  
Today, low income families with dependent children and living in rental accommodation might receive 
almost half of their disposable income from government transfers (Keating 2004: 116).  These days 
almost one third of all Australian adult residents now receive some form government income support.   10 
 
Prospects and Future Directions? 
Beyond the problems and responses outlined above, another large medium term labour market 
issue confronting Australia stems from demographic dynamics.  Between 1978-98, annual labour force 
growth  averaged  1.9  per  cent,  but  from  1998-2016,  the  ABS  estimates  that  this  growth  rate  will 
average only half the former rate, with labour force growth of only 0.8 per cent annually.  Indeed, both 
labour force growth and the labour force participation rate are expected to decline substantially, due to 
a slower rate of population growth and an ageing population.  Independent of any other shift, these 
changes  should  help  bring  down  unemployment  and  could  well  lead  to  future  widespread  labour 
shortages.  No doubt, targeted immigration programs will continue to play a role in partly dealing with 
Australia’s labour requirements, but labour shortages across many of the advanced economies (or at 
least those with slow labour force growth) will intensify international competition for skilled mobile 
labour.  In a context in which many of the best paid and most rewarding jobs require high skills, and 
where economic growth is increasingly related to the skills and talents of the workforce, Australia will 
need to try and lift the education and skills of the labour force.   
In the short to medium term, the labour market divisions and disadvantages outlined above, 
and which are increasing played out on a spatial and regional basis, will also need to be addressed.  
Both supply-side and demand-side policies need to blended in new innovative ways.  People need to be 
educated and up-skilled for the top end jobs, and over time more of such jobs and areas of employment 
need  to  be  created  through  higher  levels  of  education,  training,  innovation  and  investment  in  the 
economy.    This  will  hopefully  offer  more,  better  and  different  opportunities  than  those  that  were 
mainly created in the Australia economy in the last decade – low end, casual and part-time service 
sector jobs featuring low wages. 
However, education, retraining and skills upgrading programs need to be seen in perspective.  
Whilst useful, particularly in the longer term as part of a national economic upgrading process, in the 
short to medium term the training route can only be a partial answer to unemployment and labour 
market disadvantage because it focuses mainly on the supply of labour and not on the supply of jobs.  
In a recent study of the relationship between skills upgrading and unemployment, Chapman's (1999) 
'major conclusion is that the answer to Australian job creation, at least in the short to medium term, 
does not lie in increasing the skills of the unemployed'.  Serious consideration also needs to be given to 
the  little  debated  possibility  that  the  level  of  commitment,  intellect  and  knowledge  required  to 
successfully participate in the labour market may be increasingly beyond the capacity of many.   As the 
American  writer,  Larry  Letich  (1995)  has  argued:  'It  is  possible  that  over  the  last  100  years,  and 
especially the last 40, we may have created a society that demands more brain power than most people 
are  able  to  give'.    If  so,  even  an  advanced  'training  augmented'  labour  market  will  fail  the  key 
distributional tasks of providing jobs and adequate incomes for many of those at the bottom.  In this 
situation,  the  only  solution  is  to  explicitly  supply  jobs  with  reasonable  wages  that  match  feasible 
capabilities and talents.  This is an explicitly distributional issue which in an increasingly knowledge 
based economy the market is not solving.   11 
Conclusion 
Despite an exceptionally long period of economic expansion since the recession of the early 
1990s, official unemployment rates have only recently returned to the rates prevailing in the late 1970s, 
and  are  still  well  above  those  of  the  post-war  ‘Golden  Age‘.  In  part,  this  reflects  the  fact  that 
unemployment is an inherently intractable problem, but the slow progress also reflects the fact that 
reducing unemployment has not,  in general, been a high  policy priority.  If the current expansion 
continues, it may be argued that the government’s strategy of focusing on economic fundamentals, and 
waiting for unemployment to decline as a result, has been vindicated. If, however, there is another 
recession any time in the next few years, it is likely that the expansion beginning in 1990 will be 
viewed as a missed opportunity to achieve a large and durable reduction in unemployment. 
 
If we agree that good jobs and reasonable pay are absolutely central to people’s life chances in 
a capitalist economy, then the labour market challenges outlined above pose some serious problems.  
At present labour market disadvantage, unemployment, under employment and market inequality loom 
large.  In twenty years time, if not before, serious labour shortages could emerge in many areas. This 
will  obviously  have  implications  for  unemployment  and  under  employment,  although  the  issue  of 
matching available skills and job vacancies will continue.  In the meantime, and probably in the longer 
term,  many  Australians  (particularly  those  without  skills  or  those  suffering  other  forms  of  labour 
market  disadvantage)  will  remain  unemployed,  under  employed  or  on  low  incomes.    Hence,  the 
problem of helping those who cannot easily up skill or compete in the labour market should be a 
priority. 
These challenges will confront  employment,  labour market and social policy makers with 
major conceptual and administrative problems.  In recent years there have been calls that older forms 
of  statist  and  top  down  policy  making  in  these  areas  should  be  partly  dissolved  down  into  more 
participatory forms of decision making in neighborhoods, communities and regions and that the state 
should ‘enable’ rather than direct (Botsman and Latham 2001; Smyth and Wearing 2002).  Similar 
calls from various quarters have argued that the welfare state was never originally designed for long 
term  support for the unemployed or disadvantaged  and that older welfare state models now foster 
passive welfare dependency.  The new emphasise is now on welfare to work programs and ‘mutual 
obligation’ (Considine 2002).  Whilst laudable in some respects, many of the agendas and programs 
say too little about the actual creation of jobs.  At their worst they descend into born-again forms of 
communitarianism, or mercilessly prod the unemployed and disadvantaged through workfare programs 
with few jobs in sight at the end.  
A further issue that needs to be confronted is that effectively dealing with unemployment, 
underemployment, inequality and education and skills upgrading will be expensive.  The net costs of 
the required programs and initiatives (given the various returns and spin offs) are likely to much lower 
than the gross costs.  However, the next several decades contain a fiscal time bomb stemming from the 
likely costs of an ageing population, more expensive health care, education and skill enhancement, 
public  infrastructure  investment,  protection  of  the  environment  and  other  non-insignificant  new   12 
expenditures.  Keating (2004: 148) estimates that new public expenditure requirements will amount to 
an additional 10 per cent of GDP.  If we add new and continuing costs of dealing with labour market 
disadvantage and social and economic inequality, this amounts to a huge increase in public expenditure 
and raises serious questions about the fiscal capacity of the state in an era in which public cynicism of 
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